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Abstract: In this paper we examine the impact of a professor’s hotness, as rated by students, on his or 
her salary, controlling for research and teaching productivity. We also estimate the impacts of a 
professor’s hotness on the quality of his or her teaching, as evaluated by students, and the impact of 
hotness on research productivity, as measured by citations, publications, co-authorship, and grant 
funding. Our study is based on data describing economics professors at sixteen universities. Although a 
relatively small proportion of our sample is rated “hot” by students, hotness generates, for some, a 
significant earnings premium, even with comprehensive controls for productivity. We find a strong 
relationship between hotness and teaching productivity, but a much weaker relationship between 
hotness and research productivity.  The unique contribution of this paper is the use of data on actual 
productivity, which is generally unavailable in papers assessing the returns to appearance.  
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The effect of hotness on pay and productivity 
 
Our paper is motivated, first, by a long-standing puzzle:  Are beautiful people paid more because 
they are more productive, or because employers or consumers have a taste for beauty? (Hamermesh 
and Biddle, 1994; Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006; Kuhn and Shen, 2009)  Our second motivation is the 
availability of data. The website ratemyprofessors.com allows students to rate their professors’ 
appearance:  “(just for fun): __ hot __ not.”  In this paper we employ a unique panel data set with 
information on academic salaries, a wide range of measures of both the quantity and quality of research 
and teaching output, extensive human capital controls, and our key explanatory variable of interest, 
hotness.  The contribution of our paper is to estimate the impact of hotness on earnings controlling for 
productivity, and the impact of hotness on direct measures of productivity, namely teaching and 
research output. We are not aware of any other paper that is able to use real-world data on productivity 
when estimating the economic impacts of attractiveness. 
Although ratemyprofessors asks students to evaluate “appearance,” the framing used, hot or 
not, has sexual connotations. Hotness captures both beauty and the multiple dimensions of personality 
that contribute to sexual attractiveness. Understanding this is crucial to the interpretation of our 
findings. The absence of a return to hotness strongly suggests that beauty has no real effects. The 
presence of a positive return for hotness, however, may reflect either returns to beauty or returns to 
sexual attractiveness.   We interpret our findings, therefore, in the context of the growing body of 
research on the relationship between attractiveness, masculinity/femininity, and labor market 
outcomes (Johnson and Tassinary, 2007; Bowles, Babcock and Lai, 2007).  Our finding that, for certain 
groups, hotness has a significant effect on pay contributes to the growing body of evidence that 
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personality (Nyhus and Pons, 2005) and sexuality (Miller, Tybur, and Jordan, 2007) matters in the labor 
market.  
Hotness information was included in the ratemyprofessors.com website for fun, but our analysis 
uses serious methods. Panel data and an extensive list of covariates allow rich controls for individual 
heterogeneity. We perform numerous robustness tests, and find that our results, particularly for the 
effect of hotness on salaries, hold across a wide range of estimation techniques and specifications. Our 
results documenting which demographic groups receive a premium for hotness, and which measures of 
productivity respond most to hotness, enhance understanding of the academic labor market. 
1.  Related Literature 
In this paper we draw upon two related literatures.  The first is research on academic labor 
markets, for example, studies of gender and other determinants of pay (Barbezat, 1987; 1991), 
promotion (Ginther and Kahn, 2004), co-authorship (Boschini and Sjögren, 2007) and citation rates (Di 
Vaio, Waldenström and Weisdorf, 2009).  Findings that are particularly useful for interpreting our results 
are Blackaby, Booth and Frank’s (2005) result that the ability to generate outside offers is an important 
source of academic salary variation, and Warman, Worswick and Woolley’s (2010) demonstration of the 
cohort effects in academic salary determination.  
We also draw upon the small existing literature on professorial pulchritude. A number of studies 
have found a positive relationship between instructors’ attractiveness and teaching evaluations using 
either independent measures of instructors’ beauty (Hamermesh and Parker, 2005; Süssmuth, 2006) or 
ratemyprofessors.com hotness data (Felton, Mitchell and Stinson, 2004; Riniolo, Johnson, Sherman, and 
Misso, 2006;  Freng and Webber, 2009).  With respect to other dimensions of academic success, 
Hamermesh (2006) finds that better-looking economists are more likely to be elected to the American 
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Economics Association executive, while Green, Mixon , and Trevino (2005) find empirical support for the 
hypothesis that, because attractiveness increases teaching productivity more than it increases research 
productivity, hot professors would be more likely to chose careers at liberal arts universities.  However 
we know of no other studies that link hotness to earnings and research productivity. 
2. Data 
The population analyzed in this paper is all tenured and tenure-track faculty members appointed 
to the sixteen university economics departments in the province of Ontario, Canada, at some point 
between 1996 and 2006, with the exception of those holding university-level administrative positions. 
This population was identified through individual and university web pages, university calendars, and 
the Canadian Economics Association newsletter. Data were obtained on individuals’ salaries and 
productivity from 1996 to 2006 using a variety of publicly available sources such as provincial 
government web sites, granting agencies’ competition results, the Econlit database and the Social 
Sciences Citation Index. The resulting panel comprises 493 individuals, observed over time to create a 
sample size of 3,455 observations. Table A1 provides descriptive statistics, while Appendix B provides a 
detailed summary of the sources used for each variable. Of these various data sources, two - those for 
salary information and for hotness -- merit detailed discussion.  
Our salary data is obtained from public sector salary disclosure information published by the 
Ontario Ministry of Finance. As a result of the 1996 Ontario Public Sector Salary Disclosure Act, the 
salaries of all university professors earning $100,000 or more are listed. The salary release consists of an 
individual’s calendar year (January to December) gross earnings.1
                                                          
1 Additional duties carried out through an individual’s own university (for example, teaching a summer course) are 
included; outside consulting or other activities (for example, teaching at another university while on sabbatical) are 
excluded. Individuals on maternity or parental leave receive additional government payments which are not 
 In 1996, 13.2 percent of the 
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individuals in our sample had salaries over $100,000, but by 2006 we are able to observe directly the 
salaries of 58.2 percent of economics professors.  
 Hotness data is obtained from the website www.ratemyprofessors.com (RMP). On this site, 
students anonymously evaluate their professors’ easiness, helpfulness, clarity and “appearance”. 
Helpfulness and clarity are averaged to generate a single rating for quality, while ease and appearance 
are reported separately. A sample rate my professor form is provided in Appendix A. We utilize 
responses to the question: “Appearance (just for fun): __ hot __ not.” Ratemyprofessors assigns a score 
of +1 for each hot rating and -1 for each not. If the number of hots exceeds the number of nots, a chili 
pepper appears in the professors’ summary.2 Since our attempts to obtain historical data through web 
archives or directly from ratemyprofessors.com were unsuccessful, we use the cumulative ratings 
between April 21, 2001, when ratemyprofessors added Canadian schools3
There are some limitations to ratemyprofessors data. Students non-randomly self-select onto 
ratemyprofessors.com. Intuition suggests that students who particularly like or dislike a professor are 
more likely to enter their ratings on the website relative to individuals who are less pronounced in their 
tastes. The number of ratings provided is not large. In our sample, the mean number of ratings is 16 (see 
Table A1) including those who receive no ratings – a group that consists primarily of older faculty and 
those teaching small upper level or graduate courses. Non-students can create ratings, and a single 
student can create several positive or negative ratings. Yet official teaching evaluations also suffer from 
, and the time that we 
collected the data in 2009.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
included here, however we control (imperfectly) for this with the generated variable ‘sabbatical,’ a dummy that 
indicates the individual has experienced a year-on-year drop in salary. 
2 http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/faq.jsp 
3 http://web.archive.org/web/20010622210910/www.ratemyprofessors.ca/canada/New.asp 
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selection bias, for example, when in-class evaluations are used, students who drop the course, do not 
attend class, or simply cannot be bothered to fill out the form are not included.  
There are several arguments that can be made in support of using ratemyprofessors ratings. 
First, they correlate highly with official university evaluations (Timmerman, 2008: abstract), which 
suggests that the selection bias on ratemyprofessors is no worse than selection bias in other forms of 
student-based evaluation. Hoopes and Albrecht (2007) find that “the rankings of official university 
evaluations and RMP [ratemyprofessors.com] are very similar…lending validity to RMP as a tool for 
intra-university comparison of potential professors.” Second, ratemyprofessors is written by students 
for students, and is often the only source of information available about the quality of a potential 
instructor. In the course of writing this paper, we read hundreds of evaluations. Overwhelmingly, the 
ratings simply try to provide useful information for other students, for example, “You need to listen to 
him carefully by sitting in the very front. Otherwise you will do very bad in his class.”4
A third argument in support of using ratemyprofessors rankings is that openness creates quality 
controls. Misleading ratings can be and are corrected by subsequent users, as in “Best econ prof at 
______, ignore the bad reviews.”
  
5
                                                          
4 Rating of Professor ___________, University of Ottawa, source: www.ratemyprofessors.ca. 
 This is particularly true of our hotness variable, where a spurious hot 
vote is negated by a single not vote. Fourth, users may flag offensive ratings, and ask that they be 
removed. Finally, the ratemyprofessor rankings reflect, on average, 16 evaluations of a professor’s 
hotness. This contrasts with, for example, Hamermesh and Parker (2005), for example, which base 
beauty estimates on six evaluations. Moreover, students rate a professor on how attractive he or she is 
in real life – a rating that includes the person’s voice, gestures, and so on. Hence it provides a better 
5 Rating of Frances Woolley, source: www.ratemyprofessors.ca, accessed July 23, 2010 
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estimate of the effect of real world attractiveness than commonly used measures such as ratings of 
photographs. 
There are some limitations to our hotness measure. For example, to test the hypothesis that the 
beautiful are paid more because of employer discrimination, we would ideally like to know how 
beautiful each individual in our sample was when, say, they were hired. Unfortunately, we observe 
individuals at different stages in their life-cycle, and there is a strong correlation between perceived 
hotness and age.6
3. The Effect of Hotness on Pay: Empirical strategy 
 For example, in our sample, 27 percent of female assistant professors are hot, but no 
female full professor has a chili pepper. For men, 20 percent of assistant professors are hot, compared 
to six percent of full professors.  We overcome this limitation through the use of age controls, by 
breaking down our sample by gender and cohort, drawing upon individual student comments and 
integrating our results with the broader literature on physical attractiveness. 
Our model is straightforward adaption of Hamermesh and Biddle (1994). Faculty members’ 
earnings depend upon appearance and productivity: 
Yit
*= βaθi + α0 + αi + αt +αm+ X’it,PβP + X’it,NP βNP +X’it,T βT + εit    (1) 
Equation (1) is a simple human capital earnings model, augmented to include hotness. The variable Yit
* is 
individual i’s earnings at time t. We use the notation Yit
* to indicate that salary is a latent variable, that 
is, we do not observe every individual’s actual salary, as discussed below. Warman, Worswick, and 
Woolley (2010) find that academic salaries in Canada follow a normal distribution. Accordingly, we use 
salaries, as opposed to log salaries, as our dependent variable. We adjust all salary data for inflation 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The error term, εit , is assumed to follow a normal distribution, 
                                                          
6 The correlation between “hot” and year of PhD is 0.22 – note that year of PhD is decreasing in age.  
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with mean zero. Since we observe the same individuals repeatedly, the error terms are not 
independent, but instead are clustered at the individual level. 
The variable θi is a time-invariant measure of an individual’s hotness, taking on a value of one if 
the number of hot ratings on ratemyprofessors.com exceeds the number of not ratings – that is, if the 
professor has a chili pepper. Our study differs from others such as Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) in that 
we consider just one occupation. In a single occupation hotness could be negatively correlated with 
earnings. If there is a bias against unattractive individuals at the time of hiring then, all else being equal, 
a less attractive individual must be better qualified in other respects to obtain an academic position 
(have a more interesting job market paper, for example). If these other characteristics are more closely 
correlated with long-run academic success, those hired for looks will eventually fall behind. Morever, if 
Green, Mixon, and Trevino’s (2005) hypothesis that looks are valued more at teaching institutions is 
correct, the concentration of the more attractive at less research-intensive universities could generate 
an inverse relationship between hotness and salary. Finally, academic salaries increase with age 
(Warman, Woolley, and Worswick, 2010), but hotness does not. This could lead to an inverse 
appearance/earnings relationship if we have imperfect controls for age. 
Apart from hotness, equation (1) is a standard earnings regression. The term α0 is a constant. 
The αi are dummy variables for the 16 universities in our sample, and capture university-level salary 
differentials. The αt are time dummies that capture year-to-year variation in real salaries. We include the 
dummy variable αm to capture gender pay differentials. Together these sets of dummies control for the 
effect of non-productivity related determinants of salaries such as local living costs, overall university 
funding levels (Martinello 2006) and gender.  
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The covariates X’it,P in equation (1) are productivity controls. Earnings regressions are typically 
based on proxies for productivity, for example, experience and education. We use years since PhD and 
its squared term to measure experience. Educational quality is measured indirectly through controls for 
having an American PhD or other foreign PhD. What is highly unusual about our study is that we 
measure research productivity directly. Life-time productivity is captured using controls for rank 
(assistant, full, other, with associate being the omitted category). Productivity in the recent past is 
captured with controls for the number of journal publications in the Econlit database (and publications 
squared),7 the number of books listed in Econlit, the number of citations in the social sciences citation 
index database, and amount of Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)8
The X’it,NP in equation (1) are covariates that are non-productivity specific. We construct dummy 
variables that capture whether or not an individual is currently on sabbatical, whether or not the 
individual is a department chair, and the type of remuneration scheme employed by the university. 
Using Chant’s (2005) typology, we divide the universities in our sample into those with and without 
 research 
grant funding obtained in the previous year. We use one year lagged values of these productivity 
measures because, in all the universities in our sample, a faculty member’s annual salary increase is 
based on collectively negotiated increments and, if the university has merit pay, on productivity in the 
past year (Chant, 2005). Citations, however, are defined as citations of all works published over a life-
time, and SSHRC grant funding is based on productivity in the five years prior to the grant application 
date, so although these are annual variables, they reflect productivity over a longer time span. 
                                                          
7 We also experimented with including controls for publication quality. Adding a control for the presence of a top 
10 publication in the previous year increased the estimated marginal effect of hotness in Table 1 case 5 to from 
12,957, significant at p=0.01, to 13,465, also significant at p=0.01.  
8 The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is the primary source of research funding for 
most economists in the country. SSHRC grants are highly competitive, and the awards are determined by a 
committee comprised of academic economists. 
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unions, merit pay9
The variables X’it,T are controls for the quantity (number of ratings) and quality (helpfulness, 
clarity and ease) of teaching. Our measure of teaching productivity is, however, a mix of past, present 
and future output, consisting of average ratemyprofessor scores based on cumulative ratings since 
2001. We include εit as the time-varying error component.  
 and salary caps. We include dummy variables to control for the type of pay scheme 
present at the university.  
 In estimating equation (1), we face both selection and censoring issues. The selection issue 
arises because not all individuals are rated on ratemyprofessors, and the selection of individuals to be 
rated is non-random. Older professors, for example, are less likely to be rated. We address this selection 
issue by using an observed variable, a dummy equal to one for professors who are not rated, that 
identifies the unrated professors and proxies this selection into rating. This selection variable is 
consistently important in explaining academic pay. We also model selection into the ratemyprofessors 
database, as described in Appendix C, and find that, if anything, the impact of hotness on pay and 
productivity is amplified when we take the potential endogeneity of being rated into account. 
The censoring issue arises because, since our data is obtained from the Ontario salary 
disclosure, we have salary information for those earning over $100,000 only.  This is a standard “type 1” 
tobit situation (Amemiya, 1985). Our observed variable, Yit, is equal to the true salary, Yit
*, for individuals 
earning over $100,000; otherwise, we observe only the lower limit of $100,000.  
Yit = Yit
* if Yit
*>$100,000, $100,000 otherwise     (2) 
                                                          
9 In a number of Ontario universities, there is no merit pay – an individual’s annual increment is independent of his 
or her teaching or research productivity (Chant, 2005). In universities with salary caps, any individual earning at or 
above the cap can only receive a salary increase if the cap increases. 
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Combining equations (1) and (2), our dependent variable is defined as: 
 Yit = βaθi +α0 + αi + αt +αm+ X’it,PβP + X’it,NP βNP +X’it,T βT + εit if Yit
*>$100,000 
  100,000 otherwise       (3) 
We estimate equation (3) using a standard Stata maximum likelihood tobit regression that 
accounts for individual and group specific effects as well as time effects. As the data used to estimate 
this model are observed over a period of 11 years (from 1996 to 2006), and individuals are hired and 
retire during this period, we have an unbalanced panel. We recognize the panel nature of our data by 
clustering the standard errors by individual in order to account for unobserved correlations across 
individuals over time.  
Because of inflation, equation (3) is not an exact description of our data. For example, in the first 
year of our data, the salary cut-off was $100,000 in 1996 dollars, which is more than $100,000 in 2006 
dollars. Unfortunately it is not possible to control for year-to-year censoring and still maintain the panel 
aspects of our data, but the robustness checks reported in Appendix Table A2 shows that our results still 
hold with different inflation adjustments. We also report the results of different empirical specifications 
(e.g. probit, linear regression on those earning over $100,000 only) and find that our results are robust 
to our modeling choices.10
The key variable of interest – hotness – is time invariant, and we identify its impact through 
variations in hotness across individuals. This raises the possibility that coefficient estimates of hotness 
might be confounded by unobserved heterogeneity specific to each individual. As outlined in the 
discussion of equation (1) above, we use a rich set of covariates to control for any individual 
heterogeneity that is associated with an observable variable. For example, university fixed effects 
 
                                                          
10 We obtain similar results using 2006 only (though significance decreases to the 10% level due to the decrease in 
sample size), nominal dollars (i.e. no adjustment for inflation) or 1996 dollars (with a lower limit of $100,000 in 
1996 dollars).   
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capture individual heterogeneity arising from differences in pay scales across universities and 
differences in the emphasis placed on teaching versus research.  
Another possible concern is simultaneity bias between earnings and hotness. In our analysis, we 
assume that variation in hotness across individuals is exogenously correlated with earnings. However, it 
is possible that an increase in earnings allows individuals to invest in appearance, by buying nicer 
clothes, for example. If this is a strong relationship then single equation coefficient estimates of hotness 
will be correlated with the error term. We have no instrument to correct for this type of bias. However, 
while falling short of a fully satisfactory ‘fix’, the use of university and year dummies should purge some 
of this bias if it is related to location or year specific shocks.  
4. Do hot professors earn more? 
Table 1 shows the results of the estimation of equation (3) above, the impact of appearance on 
earnings. Earnings are measured as annual salary in 2006 dollars, adjusted for inflation using the 
Consumer Price Index. Hot is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if the professor had a chili 
professor, or more hots than nots, on ratemyprofessors.com. Table 1 includes asterisks noting where we 
have controlled for other determinants of salary such as research productivity.  
Table 1 shows that a hot appearance has a significant positive effect on salary. Table 1 reports 
three sets of the marginal effects. The first corresponds to the coefficient βa in equation (3), and takes 
into account the full effect of hotness, that is, the effect of being hot given that the individual is earning 
over $100,000, and also the effect of being hot on the probability of earning over $100,000. The effect of 
hotness on salary is, for our sample as a whole, always positive. Once controls for differences between 
universities, changes over time and productivity are added, the effects are both economically and 
statistically significant. In the specification with the best fit, Case 5, the coefficient on appearance 
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($12,957) is somewhat larger than earnings premium enjoyed by full professors over associates ($9,626, 
s.e. $2,598) and similar in size to the male earnings premium($11,423, s.e. $3296). To put this number 
into perspective, bear in mind that, conditional upon earning $100,000 or more, the average salary in 
our sample is $127,017, so our highest estimates of the effects of hotness on earnings are approximately 
10 percent of the average observed salary. 
More insight into the effect of appearance on earnings can be gained by computing two further 
marginal effects. The marginal effect of hotness conditional on being uncensored gives the earnings 
premium associated with being hot for those earning $100,000 or more. Among this group, the hot earn 
between $1,785 to $3,241 more than the not, with the larger (and statistically significant) estimates 
corresponding to specifications that control for years since PhD and years since PhD squared. The final 
marginal effect shows the impact of being hot on the probability of earning over $100,000. The hot are 
between 6 and 17 percentage points more likely to earn over $100,000. Again, the larger and 
statistically significant estimates correspond to specifications with controls for years since PhD. These 
results suggest that the large marginal effects reported in the first line of Table 1 are driven primarily by 
the greater likelihood of earning over $100,000 if an individual is hot – the actual effect of hotness on 
those already earning over $100,000 is considerably smaller. 
The effects reported in Table 1 seem counter to Kuhn and Shen’s (2009) argument that 
preferences for beauty are stronger in occupations with relatively lower skill requirements. Since 
university professors must have high levels of education, and research and teaching are skill-intensive, 
we would not expect hotness to have a large effect on academic salaries. It could be that hotness is a 
proxy for valuable traits such as confidence (Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006), professional ambition that 
motivates investments in appearance, or for health and reproductive fitness (Jason Weeden and John 
Sabini, 2005). Yet while hotness may be affecting salary indirectly through the productivity-enhancing 
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effects of confidence, ambition or health, it should be emphasized that hotness still has an effect on 
earnings even with rich controls for productivity.  
Further insight into the hotness/earnings relationship can be gained by breaking up our group 
into smaller sub-samples. This is done in Table 2. We use the specification corresponding to “Case 5” in 
Table 1 because it has the highest log likelihood score, so provides the best fit. The first two columns of 
Table 2 show that the positive effect of appearance on earnings is driven entirely by males. In column 2 
we find an insignificant negative relationship between hotness and pay for women.  
There are a number of reasons why men and women might receive differential returns to 
hotness. For example, hot female professors’ comments often refer to their physical appearance: 
She’s a “talk & chalk” type of professor, and it worked well with the subject matter for ECO___. 
She keeps it simple. If you go to class, take decent notes, and have common sense, you will do 
well. Also, she’s a fox. Which is a nice added bonus.” “Genuinely nice person. She is also 
dreamy.” “Took the class with her a few years ago as an elective, and got 99 with minimal effort. 
She was a pretty good professor from what I remember - she actually cares about the students. 
She’s also easy on the eyes, so it’s worth going to class.” “I couldn’t stand her in the end despite 
she is good looking.” 
These comments evaluate teaching --”pretty good professor” –and appearance --”also easy on the eyes” 
separately. Men receive personal comments also, for example “mummmmmmmmmm” , “He’s so hot” 
or “Looks a bit like Tim Robbins”, but such comments on a man’s appearance are rare. A more typical 
review is “Great Prof. Very funny. Very helpful. Tough assignments prepare you for challenging (but fair) 
exams. You actually LEARN in this class.. but do NOT miss any lectures.” Women might not experience 
the same salary premium for being hot if their hotness is more strongly determined by physical beauty. 
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As noted in the empirical strategy section above, within academia the predicted effect of beauty on 
salary is ambiguous, since an attractive appearance may allow otherwise less productive people to get 
hired. 
Further explanations of why hotness might not pay for women come from economic 
psychology. Masculine men and feminine women are more likely to deemed attractive than those of 
more androgynous appearance (Johnson and Tassinary, 2007). Other research suggests that when 
women are more demanding in negotiations, they are rated as less attractive (Bowles, Babcock and Lai, 
2007). It could be the case that characteristics that enable women to negotiate higher salaries also 
reduce women’s attractiveness in the eyes of their students. Other studies (Nyhus and Pons, 2005) have 
found that having an “agreeable” personality reduces women’s earnings.  If, for women, hotness is 
associated with being agreeable (“Genuinely nice person”), this would provide another explanation of 
why hotness might not pay.  
The age/hotness relationship is also revealing. The last four columns of Table 2 shows how the 
estimated effect of hotness changes as we gradually expand our sample from the youngest academics – 
those who received their PhD after 2000 – and include a larger and larger portion of the overall sample. 
The absence of a significant hotness return for those who earned a PhD after 1995 may reflect, in part, 
the limitations of our data. Since we only have information on individuals earning over $100,000, we do 
not observe salary data for some of the younger professors. Yet the finding of no return to hotness is 
consistent with the hypothesis that, conditional upon receiving an academic job, there is no 
discrimination in favor of the beautiful.  
 The effect of hotness on earnings increases substantially when we include mid-career 
academics. The hotness premium is primarily driven by those who received their PhD after 1985, so 
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were in their mid 30s or older when the hotness data began to be collected.  We believe the for older 
professors reflect students’ demanding standards for hotness. A high quality not-hot professor will 
typically be described as a “Great prof” with the occasional “awesome.” By way of contrast, these are 
typical reviews for senior professors who are rated as hot: 
 “I absolutely loved Professor ____. He’s one of the busiest people in the Economics department 
and yet he never sees it as an inconvenience to do what he can to help.” “I absolutely love 
Professor _____. He is amazing and the best prof at _____and in Canada!!!” 
A professor has to be special to earn a chili pepper if he’s over 40 -- “a semi-retired superman” as one 
hot professor is described – charismatic, charming, well-organized and likeable.  
Why might semi-retired supermen earn more? In most Ontario universities, an academic 
negotiates his or her initial starting salary, and from that point onwards pay increases are largely 
determined by standard increments built into the collective agreement (Chant, 2005; Warman, Woolley 
and Worswick, 2010). The best way to negotiate a substantial pay increase is to obtain an outside offer. 
Indeed, Blackaby, Booth and Frank (2005) find that the ability to generate outside offers is a key factor 
explaining earnings inequality among academic economists in the UK. Although we cannot test this 
directly, it seems plausible that charismatic and likeable professors might be better able to generate 
outside offers. This also would explain why we find a hotness effect for men only – Blackaby, Booth and 
Frank (2005) found that women typically had difficulty generating outside offers because they were less 
mobile.  
5. Teaching productivity 
The findings in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that men, in particular, are paid more if they have a hot 
appearance. But are the hot also more productive? Most papers in the beauty literature are unable to 
16 
 
answer this question, as they lack direct measures of productivity. For academics, however, productivity 
can be measured directly by counting publications, research grants, citations, and so on. In the 
remainder of the paper, we explore the effect of hotness on productivity. It should be noted that the 
effects of hotness on productivity found in this section do not explain the premiums for hotness 
reported in Tables 1 and 2 as these regressions included controls for productivity. Instead, the effects of 
hotness on productivity constitute additional indirect impacts of hotness on earnings. 
There are two components of academic productivity, teaching and research. We measure 
teaching productivity using students’ perceptions of instructor quality, Qi, as measured by instructors’ 
scores on the ratemyprofessor website. (Unfortunately we have no other indicators of teaching 
productivity, such as the amount learnt by students.) Our hypothesis is that perceived teaching quality is 
a function of hotness, experience and teaching effort and research productivity. Hotness can affect 
measured teaching quality in a number of ways. First, consumers (students) may discriminate in favour 
of more attractive professors, giving them higher rankings for the same level of teaching quality. Second, 
more attractive people may indeed be better at conveying information, perhaps because students pay 
more attention (“She’s also easy on the eyes, so it’s worth going to class.”) Third, ratemyprofessors 
hotness rankings may proxy underlying personality traits, for example, charisma or empathy, which are 
valuable in teaching. To clarify the relationship between hotness and teaching productivity, we also 
consider the effect of hotness on students’ ratings of professors’ easiness. 
Ratemyprofessors scores have four components: helpfulness, clarity, quality (a weighted 
average of helpfulness and clarity), and easiness. All are measured on a scale of one (which 
ratemyprofessors.com describes as useless, incomprehensible, hard) to five (or, in 
ratemyprofessors.com language, extremely helpful, crystal, easy). We assume 
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Qi =  βaθi +α0 +αi + X’it,,ExpβExp + X’it,TE βTE +X’it,RP βRP + εit     (4) 
 
where Qi is the teaching quality rating observed on ratemyprofessors (We use no time subscript since 
our measure of quality is time-invariant.)  As earlier, θi measures hotness, taking on a value of one if the 
number of hot ratings exceeds the number of nots. The parameter α0 is a constant and the αi represent 
university fixed effects. The vector X’it,Exp includes our measures of experience, rank and years since PhD. 
The controls for teaching effort, X’it,TE , are being on sabbatical, being a department chair, university-
level incentives to exert a high level of effort in teaching or publication such as merit pay, and a 
professor’s number of ratings. X’it,RP is a measure of research productivity, and uses the same controls as 
our earnings regressions in Table 2. We estimate the hotness-quality effect separately for males and 
females so do not include a gender dummy.  
Since teaching quality is time invariant, using all years of our panel adds little information on our 
dependent variable. We therefore restricted our sample to 2006 only. This also minimizes any potential 
problems arising from missing observations. As noted earlier, not every individual in our sample receives 
a rating on ratemyprofessors. In the earnings regressions, we were able to control for the presence of 
missing observations by including a dummy variable indicating that the individual had not been ranked 
on ratemyprofessors. For the teaching variables, we cannot use that strategy, as every individual with 
missing hotness information is also missing teaching quality information.11
                                                          
11 In theory, we could correct for sample selection bias using the standard Heckman technique. Unfortunately, any 
variable plausibly correlated with not being included in ratemyprofessors (age, administrative duties, research 
output) would also be expect to affect teaching quality, leaving us without an instrument to carry out the Heckman 
correction. 
 By restricting our sample to 
2006 only, we create a more balanced panel, with fewer missing observations.  
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Table 3 estimates equation 4, the impact of hotness on teaching quality, clarity, helpfulness and 
easiness for men and women.12
Overall quality is an average of a professor’s scores for helpfulness and clarity. Considering these 
two individually, we see that hotness has a stronger effect on men’s clarity than their helpfulness, 
although the difference in coefficients is not statistically significant. For women hotness has a large, 
significant positive effect on perceived helpfulness. The effect of hotness on clarity, while positive, is not 
statistically significant. These findings are consistent with the idea that students are picking up on 
different attributes when they rate their male professors as hot as compared to when they rate their 
female professors as hot. 
  We find, as do Bonds-Raacke and Raacke (2007) and Lawson and 
Stephenson (2005), a strong positive relationship between hotness and overall quality. The difference 
between our paper and others is that we also control for experience, effort and ability, confirming the 
robustness of the hotness/quality relationship.  
What about the effect of hotness on ease? Hotness has less of an effect on ease than clarity or 
helpfulness. As noted earlier, Johnson and Tassinary (2007) find that feminine women are more likely to 
be rated as attractive. Nelson (1995) argues that, in North American culture, rigor and toughness is 
associated with masculinity. Hence our result that the female professors voted not hot also received 
lower ease ratings – that is, were more rigorous and tough – is evidence in support of the connection 
between hotness and feminine behavior. 
                                                          
12 We also estimated a cross section generalized least squares (GLS) regression using all years of data. The GLS 
results (available from the authors on request) are qualitatively similar but, due to the larger sample size, have 
much stronger statistical significance. The GLS point estimates for males are similar to the 2006 only estimates, but 
the point estimate of the effect of hotness on female professors’ reported overall quality (0.52) and helpfulness 
(0.53) is smaller with the GLS results.  
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  The average effect of hotness on perceived teaching quality is large– on a scale of 1 to 5, a hot 
professor is, on average, rated 0.67 points higher (overall results, not reported in Table 3). However 
being a good quality professor has few monetary returns. In the regression reported as case 7 in Table 1, 
the coefficients on ease, helpfulness and clarity are all positive but insignificant: easiness $2534 
(standard error (s.e.) $1445), helpfulness $813 (s.e. $2043), clarity $814 (s.e. $1905). Moreover, 
comparing case 7 with the other cases, controls for teaching quality make little difference to the 
explanatory power of the earnings equation. So while the positive effect of hotness on teaching 
productivity is interesting, it does not explain the earnings premium associated with hotness. 
6. Research productivity 
We separately consider a number of elements of research productivity: number of publications 
per year, number of citations per year, receipt of a SSHRC grant, and number of co-authors (derived 
from publications per year). We assume each element of research productivity depends upon hotness 
(θi), experience (Xit,,Exp), teaching effort (Xit,TE), and other aspects of research achievement (Xit,
j
R).  
Pi,
j
t=f(θi ,α0 ,αi , Xit,,Exp, Xit,TE , Xit,
j
R, εit)     (5) 
where Pi,
j
t  is the j
th element of research productivity, measured at time t for individual i. Our hotness, 
experience and teaching effort measures are the same as in the teaching regression. Our “other aspects 
of research” (Xit,
j
R) capture the inherent relationships between the different measures of productivity. 
For example, we use the lagged quantity of SSHRC grant funding to predict the number of publications, 
citations and co-authors, on the grounds that research funding increases research output. These 
research measures change across research productivity measures to avoid simultaneity problems. For 
example, we include the number of past publications when we are explaining the number of citations 
(one can’t be cited without publishing) but do not use citations to explain publications.  
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We have no censored observations for our research productivity measures. For the three 
quantitative measures (publications, citations, co-authors) we use a panel regression model that 
accounts for random effects to capture the remaining unexplained heterogeneity. The results of these 
regressions are shown in Table 4. We report estimates for males and females separately. Since the 
sample is predominantly male, the results for the entire sample are similar to the male results.  
Columns 1 through 4 of Table 4 show the impact of hotness on the number of citations received 
each year and on log citations. The distribution of citations is highly skewed. A small number of people 
receive a very large number of citations, while most researchers’ work is rarely cited. This makes log 
citations attractive as a dependent variable.13
Citations are often taken to indicate the quality of a publication (Hamermesh and Oster, 2002). 
However studies have documented gender differences in citation patterns, with men being more likely 
to be cited by men and women being more likely to be cited by women (Ferber, 1988). Since the 
majority of the economics profession is male, if men cite men more often, male economists will have 
higher citation rates overall, which is what is found by Ferber (1988) and, more recently, by Di Vaio, 
Waldenström and Weisdorf (2009). Table 4 shows that, for men, being hot has a minimal impact on the 
likelihood of being cited – the coefficient is positive but insignificant. For women, however, the effect of 
hotness on the log of citations is significant both economically and statistically – female hot professors 
have more than twice as many citations as the not. At the same time, however, since there is no 
 At the same time, since a relatively large number of 
individuals have citation counts of zero in any given year, logging citation counts causes us to lose a 
number of observations. Accordingly we repeated our analysis using citations (not logged). 
                                                          
13 We also experimented with a quantile regression approach in order to avoid losing information for the 
individuals who receive no citations in the social sciences citation index database in any one year. However the 
quantile regression approach did not converge for females. 
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significant impact of hotness on citations when we look at (not logged) citations, these results might be 
driven by a small number of individuals.  
Unfortunately we did not collect data on the gender of citing authors so we do not know 
whether the hotness coefficient in column 2 of Table 4 reflects more citations by male or female 
economists. Moreover, it is possible that the link between hotness and citations is driven by some third 
factor, for example, working on an interesting research topic. But it is possible that, when a woman is 
hot, men find it easier to “recognize the merit” (Ferber, 1988) in her work. And one of the interesting 
things about this finding is the implication for future career success – once an article is cited, it begins to 
show up among the top hits in google scholar, which generates more citations and further recognition. It 
would be interesting to study this sample again in ten years time and find out whether being hot at an 
early stage in an academic career has implications for long-term success. 
The next measure of productivity that we consider in Table 4 is the number of publications in 
the Econlit database. The database includes most Western English-language economics journal14 
publications and some books, but excludes, for example, book chapters or government reports. We 
consider annual publications, and estimate the effect of hotness on publications using generalized least 
squares with random effects.15
                                                          
14 “The number of journals indexed in EconLit has grown from 182 periodicals in 1969 to over 750 journals 
today. Journals are selected for inclusion in EconLit on the basis of their economic content, which must be 
substantial or of equal emphasis in interdisciplinary journals.” For list of journals included in Econlit, see 
http://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/journal_list.php. 
 For both men and women, once we control for experience, the effect of 
hotness on publication rates is positive but neither statistically nor economically significant – hot males 
publish one more article every seven years than the not, hot women one more article every 12.5 years. 
Translating this into financial terms, Sen et al (2009) find that the financial reward to an extra 
15 We also estimated the effect of hotness on obtaining a top 10 or top 21 journal publication. We found no 
significant effects. 
22 
 
publication ranges from $300 to $1,870 annually, depending upon the type of publication and the other 
controls included in the wage equation. Hence any indirect rewards to hotness via increased 
productivity are dwarfed by hotness’s direct, financial return. 
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 consider the impact of hotness on number of co-authors. 
Coauthorship rates matter because they have been hypothesized to underlie some of the gender 
disparities in the economics profession. Mcdowell and Kiholm Smith (1992) and, more recently, Boschini 
and Sjögren (2007) have found that economists tend to co-author with others of the same sex. Since 
there are relatively fewer women in the profession, this will tend to make it more difficult for women to 
find co-authors, which could, in turn, make it more difficult for women to publish.  
The number of co-authors is derived from the publications data. Again, we use generalized least 
squares with random effects. There is some suggestion in the data that hot professors of either gender 
are more desirable co-authors. The results shown in Table 4 are not statistically significant, however 
Appendix Table C1 shows that, when we control for the potential selection bias, there is a weakly 
significant (p=0.06) positive effect of hotness on co-authorship for women.16
 Our final test for the effect of hotness on productivity considered success in receiving a grant 
from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), the primary Canadian funding 
council. The amount of grant funds received by successful applicants depends upon the individual’s field 
 Hamermesh and Oster 
(2002: 539) suggest that coauthorship has “consumption benefits,” that is, people choose to coauthor 
with people whom they enjoy working with. Our results are consistent with the idea that the 
characteristics which make students rank professors as hot also make people desirable co-authors, but 
fall short of providing definite support for Hamermesh and Oster’s hypothesis. 
                                                          
16 For women, if we do not control for age, there is a statistically significant relationship between hotness and 
number of coauthors. However this may reflect a secular trend towards more co-authorship over time. 
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of research. Experimental economics, for example, is particularly expensive. Because we do not wish our 
measure of research funding success to be sensitive to the applicant’s field, we define our dependent 
variable to be one during every year in which an individual held a SSHRC grant, and 0 otherwise. We use 
probit regression to estimate the probability of being in receipt of SSHRC funds. The controls employed 
are set out in equation 5, and are similar to those used in previous regressions. 
 Empirical results are reported in Table 5. We report separate estimates for males and females. 
The coefficient estimate on being hot is negative for both males and females, however when we control 
for selection into being rated hot, as described in Appendix C, the estimated impact of hotness is 
positive. In no case are the estimates statistically significant. Pooling the data together and running the 
regressions jointly for males and females did not change the significance of the ‘hot’ covariate. One way 
of understanding these results is to remember that the success rate for SSHRC grants is very low. Just 17 
percent of men and 14 percent of the women in our sample receive any SSHRC funding. At the highly 
competitive level of SSHRC grant funding, hotness does not matter.  
7. Conclusions 
Male professors who are rated as hot by their students earn more, female professors do not. The results 
for men are primarily driven by mid-career and senior academics. The absence of a hotness premium for 
junior academics suggests that, conditional upon being hired for an academic position, appearance has a 
minimal impact on initial salaries. For established male academics, we hypothesize that hotness may be 
capturing masculine personality traits, such as assertiveness or confidence, that are associated with 
both sexual attractiveness and an ability to command higher salaries. 
The results for research productivity are more mixed. There is some evidence that hot women 
are more likely to be cited, but this result is based on a small sub-sample. More generally, although the 
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impact of hotness on measures of research productivity is usually positive, the relationship is not 
statistically significant. Both genders are much more likely to be rated as high quality teachers if they are 
hot, however the effect for women comes primarily from the positive effect of hotness on helpfulness, 
whereas hot men receive higher clarity scores.  
 We were genuinely surprised at the strength of the relationship that we found between hotness 
and earnings. We used numerous specifications and robustness tests to make sure that our results were 
not simply an artifact of a particular modeling choice. But every attempt to refine our empirical 
specification – introducing more productivity controls, controlling for the endogeneity of being rated – 
only increased the estimated returns to hotness. And who receives an earnings premium for hotness is 
even more interesting. For established male academics, hotness clearly pays, while women may face a 
conflict between being attractive and being financially well-rewarded.  
 Our results are not a pure measure of the effect of “beauty” on either academic salaries or 
professional productivity. Hotness measures some combination of physical attractiveness and other 
personality traits. It is possible that some people’s hotness scores come more from their good looks, 
other people are hot because they are charismatic or likeable (and probably not bad looking). But 
whatever these attributes are that generate chili peppers on ratemyprofessors, they have real impacts 
on economic outcomes.   
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Table 1: Impact of hotness on annual salary ($2006) – Censored (Tobit) Regressions 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 
Marginal effect of hotness dummy: full 
support  6,860 7,731 12,902c 12,910c 12,957c 9,219b 7,508a 
Standard error 6582 6444 4561 4564 4210 3860 4191 
Marginal effect of hotness dummy 
conditional on being uncensored 1947 2193 3239c 3241c 3153c 2232c 1785a 
Standard error 1791 1743 1009 1009 900 856 928 
Marginal effect of hotness dummy on 
probability of being uncensored 0.062 0.071 0.167c 0.167c 0.066c 0.113c 0.091a 
Standard error 0.058 0.057 0.051 0.051 0.046 0.042 0.047 
Dummy if individual has no rating on 
www.ratemyprofessor.com  * * * * * * 
Gender  * * * * * * 
University and year dummies   * * * * * 
Lagged: journal publications, journal 
publications squared, citations, SSHRC 
funding. Book. Dummies for: Department 
chair, U.S. PhD, other non-Canadian PhD. 
Number of ratings. 
  * * * * * 
Years since PhD, Years since PhD squared   * * *   
Dummies if university is unionized, has 
salary cap, or merit pay 
   * * * * 
Dummies for assistant, full professor, other 
rank, rank missing 
    * * * 
clarity, helpfulness and ease of professor (1 
to 5 scale) 
      * 
Log likelihood -14,184 -14,146 -13,186 -13,186 -13,157 -13,246 -13,240 
Notes: a denotes significance at p=0.10, b denotes significance at p=0.05, and c significance at p=0.01. The data is 
assumed to follow the observability rule in equation (2) above. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
All of the above regressions have been run using a sample of 3,455 observations based on a panel of 493 individuals. 
The estimation method is a generalization of the Tobit model introduced by Tobin (1958) – see Wooldridge (2002, 
Chapter 16).  
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Table 2: Effect of hotness (marginal effect) on annual salary of Ontario economics professors, 2006 Cdn $, 
selected sub-groups – censored regressions. 
 Male Female 
Year PhD 
>2000 
Year PhD 
>1995 
Year PhD 
>1985 
Year PhD 
>1975 
Marginal effect of hotness dummy: 
full support  13,725c -1,524 -2,396c 272 13,140c 13,323c  
Clustered standard error 4,677 6,171 913 798 909 4,390   
Marginal effect of hotness dummy 
conditional on being uncensored 3,638c -89 -67c 5 967c 2,384c 
Clustered standard error 1,078 365 26 16 60 681 
Marginal effect of hotness dummy 
on probability of being uncensored 0.189c -1.10*10-4 -3.02*10-8b 3.49*10-12 0.00406c 0.125c 
Clustered standard error 0.056 5.02*10-4 1.49*10-8 9.89*10-12 0.00013 0.030 
N (observations)  3032 423  229  547 1503  2399  
N (individuals) 416 77 86 150 272 364 
Log likelihood -12,309  -798  -385   -1,100 -3297  -7078 
 
Notes: a denotes significance at p=0.10, b denotes significance at p=0.05, and c is significance at p=0.01. The data is 
assumed to follow the observability rule in equation (2) above. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The 
estimation method is a generalization of the Tobit model introduced by Tobin (1958) – see Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 
16). The controls used correspond to “Case 5” of Table. Controls not reported include: years since PhD; years since PhD 
squared; number of ratings; lagged number of journal publications and publications squared; number of books 
published, lagged SSHRC funding; lagged citation count; dummy variables for gender (columns 3 through 6), academic 
rank, year, university, union, salary cap, merit pay schemes, and a dummy indicating individual was not rated on 
www.ratemyprofessors.com. 
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Table 3: Impact of a “hot” appearance (marginal effect) on students’ evaluations of teaching 
performance, 2006 only  
  Quality Clarity Helpfulness Easiness 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Hot  0.72c   0.81b 0.76c  0.55  0.68c  1.02c  0.12 0.43a  
Standard error 0.16   0.30 0.17  0.36  0.16  0.28  0.13  0.23  
Adjusted r2  0.11  0.40 0.10  0.17  0.11  0.54  0.05  0.44  
 N  229  46 229  46 229  46 229  46 
 
Notes: a denotes significance at p=0.10, b denotes significance at p=0.05, and c is significance at p=0.01. 
The evaluations of teaching, quality, clarity, helpfulness, and easiness, range from 1 to 5. Controls not 
reported include: academic rank dummies; dummies for sabbatical leave, whether the individual is a 
department chair and whether the individual has a PhD from a U.S. or any other non-Canadian 
university; university dummies; dummies for union, salary cap, merit pay schemes; lagged publications 
and publications squared; lagged SSHRC funding; lagged citation count; years since PhD and its square; 
number of ratings on ratemyprofessors. Since we have no information on the teaching performance of 
those not rated on ratemyprofessors, we do not include a “not rated” dummy. 
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Table 4: Impact of hotness on productivity measures 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log citations Citations  Annual 
publications 
Coauthors 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Hot  0.19 1.86c 0.08 -0.09 0.14 0.08 0.14 .19 
Robust standard 
error 
0.15 0.44 0.82 1.41 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 
Rho 0.13 0 0 0 0.21 0.07 0.24 0 
r2: within 0.41 0.70 0.10 0.41 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.05 
r2: overall 0.39 0.82 0.14 0.47 0.09 0.24 0.09 0.22 
r2: between 0.35 0.92 0.19 0.62 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.35 
 
Notes: a  significant at p=0.10, b significant at p=0.05, and c is significant at p=0.01. The dependent 
variables in the above regressions are log(citations), citations, annual publications, and the number of 
co-authors. All zero values are dropped when the dependent variable is log(citations). Otherwise all 
regressions are based on the entire sample. They were carried out using Generalized Least Squares with 
random effects. Robust standard errors are reported. Controls not reported include: lagged SSHRC 
funding; a dummy if the individual was not rated on www.ratemyprofessors.com; academic rank 
dummies; dummies for sabbatical leave, whether the individual is a department chair and whether the 
individual obtained a PhD from a U.S. or any other non-Canadian university; year dummies; university 
dummies; dummies for union, salary cap, merit pay schemes; years since PhD and its square term; 
number of ratings on ratemyprofessors; publication of a book. Lagged publications and publications 
squared are included in the citation but not the publications and coauthors regressions. 
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Table 5: Impact of hotness on probability of receiving a SSHRC grant: Probit analysis 
 Males Females 
 observed 
selection into not 
being rated 
Predicted 
selection into not 
being rated 
observed selection 
into not being 
rated 
Predicted 
selection into not 
being rated 
Hot (probit coefficient) -0.006 0.62 -0.147 0.113 
Clustered standard error 0.118 0.116 0.383 0.395 
Hot (marginal effect) -0.001 0.010 -0.027 0.023 
Clustered standard error 0.020 0.021 0.182 0.159 
N 2529 2529 267 267 
LR Chi2 833 838 99 96 
 
Notes: a denotes significance at p=0.10, b denotes significance at p=0.05, and c is significance at p=0.01. 
The dependent variable in the above regressions is 1- if the individual has a SSHRC grant, 0 – otherwise. 
The above table reports actual probit coefficient estimates as well as the marginal effects of being Hot. 
Standard errors are beneath marginal effects estimates and clustered at the individual level. “Observed 
selection” regressions include a dummy if the individual was not rated on www.ratemyprofessors.com; 
“predicted selection” regressions Controls not reported include: academic rank dummies; dummies for 
sabbatical leave, whether the individual is a department chair and whether the individual is from a U.S. 
or any other non-Canadian university; year dummies; university dummies; dummies for union, salary 
cap, merit pay schemes; and lagged publications and publications squared. 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics.  
Notes: includes all years. In this table, professors receiving no ratings are coded as zero for hotness, ease, clarity and helpfulness. 
ENTIRE SAMPLE (N=3455) HOT ONLY (N=349) MALES (N=3032) FEMALES (N=423) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables 
Salary ($2006) (≥$100,000 only) $127,017  $19,550 $129,983 $265,412 $127,672 $19,783 $117,418 $12,313 
Proportion earning <$100,000 0.69 0.46 0.64 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.84 0.37 
Clarity 2.44 1.66 3.95 0.69 2.45 1.68 2.34 1.45 
Helpfulness 2.47 1.66 3.95 0.66 2.48 1.69 2.39 1.46 
Easiness 2.13 1.40 3.04 0.56 2.13 1.42 2.12 1.27 
Annual citations 1.26 5.53 1.91 6.23 1.35 5.83 0.56 2.36 
Annual publications 0.52 0.92 0.69 1.08 0.53 0.95 0.41 0.72 
Coauthors 0.49 1.18 0.74 1.39 0.51 1.22 0.34 0.84 
Any SSHRC funding 0.17 0.37 0.27 0.44 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 
Explanatory variables 
Hot 0.10 0.30 1.00 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.37 
Not rated 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42 
Yrs since PhD 17.87 10.52 11.69 9.93 18.86 10.44 10.80 8.02 
Yrs since PhD2 430.01 406.84 235.02 346.08 464.79 412.68 180.69 245.99 
Below Asst. 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.15 
Assistant 0.21 0.41 0.46 0.50 0.18 0.39 0.40 0.49 
Associate 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.38 0.48 
Full 0.46 0.50 0.28 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.18 0.38 
Rank missing 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 
Sabbatical 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.28 
Publications squared  1.11 3.76 1.63 4.07 1.17 3.95 0.69 1.84 
Chair 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.21 
Num. Ratings 16.49 22.09 15.61 13.69 16.96 23.02 13.11 13.31 
Book 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.07 
Male 0.88 0.33 0.81 0.40 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SSHRC funding ($’000s) 4.95 24.30 7.10 21.51 5.18 25.57 3.27 11.63 
US PhD 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.37 0.48 
Other PhD 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33 
Union 0.60 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.68 0.47 
Salary cap 0.33 0.47 0.16 0.37 0.31 0.46 0.43 0.50 
Merit pay 0.86 0.35 0.85 0.35 0.87 0.34 0.79 0.41 
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Appendix Table A2: Robustness checks 
 Tobit regression Tobit regressions, “Not rated” 
dummy 
Probit  GLS  GLS  
  Without 
selection 
control 
“Not 
rated” 
dummy 
“Not 
rated” 
prediction 
2006 only Nominal 
salaries 
1996$, 
lower limit 
$100,000  
Over 
$100K=1 
Salaries 
over 
$100K only 
Log salary, 
Over 
$100K only 
Hot: marginal effect (full 
support) 
13,442c 12,957c 13,899c 6,727a 10,274c 9,753b 0.15c 6535c 0.045c 
Clustered standard error 4,154 4,209 4,205 3,796 3,809 4,237 0.03 2517 0.017 
Hot: marginal effect 
(uncensored only) 
3,288c 3,154c 3,453c 3,089a 2,323c 1,515c n/a n/a n/a 
Clustered standard error 888c 900c 906c 1622 757 578 n/a n/a n/a 
Hot: marginal effect on 
probability of being 
censored 
0.173 0.165 0.184 0.132a 0.153c 0.072c n/a n/a n/a 
Clustered standard error 0.045 0.046 0.047 0.078 0.047 0.023 n/a n/a n/a 
N (observations) 3455 3455 3455 328 3455 3455 3424 1080 1080 
N (individuals) 493 493 493 328 493 493  271 271 
log likelihood -13,158 -13,157 -13,135 -2,210 -12,821 -9,478 -1268 Χ2=879 Χ2=1157 
a) Significant at p=0.10, b) significant at p=0.05, c) significant at p=0.01 
All specifications correspond to “Case 5” of Table 1. Controls not reported: gender, dummy indicating no rmp rating, rank, year dummies (10), 
university dummies (15), union, salary cap, merit, number of ratings, lagged publications and publications squared, lagged SSHRC funding, lagged 
citation count, book, years since PhD and years since PhD squared. 
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Appendix A: 
Easiness:  
Hard    Easy 
Helpfulness:     
Useless    Extremely Helpful 
Clarity:     
Incomprehensible    Crystal 
Interest level prior to attending class:   
None at all    It’s my world! 
Textbook Use:     
Low    High 
Textbook Used*: (ex. ISBN#: 079074272X)  
Grade: 
Please Select
 
 
Attendance:  
Mandatory Not Mandatory 
Prof Status:  
Still Teaching Retired/Gone 
Appearance: (just for fun) 
Hot Not 
Class: (i.e. HIST 101, ACCT 202) 
CLAS SECTI
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Comments:  
Please keep comments clean. Libelous comments will be deleted. Guidelines 
 
Characters Typed: 
0
(Limit 350 per rating) 
Remember, YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE for what you write here.  
Rating Categories 
RateMyProfessors.com’s ratings categories: 
Easiness - Some students may factor in the easiness or difficulty of the professor or course 
material when selecting a class to take. Is this class an easy A? How much work do you need to 
do in order to get a good grade? Please note this category is NOT included in the “Overall 
Quality” rating. 
Helpfulness - Helpfulness is defined as a professor’s helpfulness and approachability. Is this 
professor approachable, nice and easy to communicate with? How accessible is the professor 
and is he/she available during office hours or after class for additional help? 
Clarity - A professor’s organization and time management skills can make a great difference on 
what you get out of the class. How well does the professor teach the course material? Were 
you able to understand the class topics based on the professor’s teaching methods and style? 
Overall Quality - The Overall Quality rating is determined by the average rating of the 
Helpfulness and Clarity given by all users. An overall rating of 3.5 to 5 is considered good 
(yellow smiley face). An overall rating of 2.5 to 5 is considered average (green smiley face). An 
overall rating of 1 to 2.5 is considered poor (blue sad face). The Easiness rating is NOT included 
when calculating the Overall Quality rating. 
Rater Interest - There is always that one class everyone recommends taking before graduating. 
As a student, how interested were you in the class, BEFORE taking it? Or how interested were 
you in taking this course from this specific professor.  
Source: http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/categories.jsp 
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Appendix B: Data Sources 
Data Source Date accessed Variables 
Department web sites, updated with 
information from university calendars 
and Canadian Economics Association 
newsletter 
Summer 2004 – 
2008  
Names of individuals to include in sample, 
identification of individuals holding 
administrative positions, academic rank. 
Department web sites, personal 
communication 
Summer 2004 – 
2008 
Department Chair (“Chair”). Note: administrative 
not research chairs. Administrators at levels 
above Chair are excluded. These are typically 
individuals with University level administrative 
responsibilities 
PROQUEST Dissertations and Theses 
database 
Summer 2004 – 
2008 
Years since PhD obtained, PhD from US 
institutions, PhD from non-US/Canadian 
institutions 
 Departmental Home Pages, gender 
references in www.ratemyprofessor.com 
Summer 2004 – 
2008 
Male 
How we pay professors and why it 
matters 
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, Nov, 
2005 (John Chant) 
Summer 2008 Dummies on university level compensation 
schemes – whether the institution is unionized, 
implements salary caps, and/or merit pay 
ECONLIT Summer 2004 – 
2008 
# publications in peer reviewed journals per year, 
# publications in peer reviewed journals prior to 
1996, number co-authors worked with, number 
of books published. The number of co-authors is 
the sum of all co-authors listed in all journal 
articles published in each year. 
“Winning Research” search at 
www.sshrc.gc.ca 
Summer 2009 SSHRC 
Social Sciences Citation Index Summer 2008 Individual citations (total number of citations 
received by an individual on an annual basis for 
cumulative research) 
Ontario Ministry of Finance website, 
accessible at 
http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/publication
s/salarydisclosure/2008/ 
Summer 2004 – 
2008 
Annual (calendar year) salary 
www.ratemyprofessors.com Summer 2009 Dummy variables for hotness, helpfulness, clarity, 
and ease 
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Appendix C: Selection issues 
Not all faculty members are rated on http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/. If the selection of 
professors for ratings is non-random, it may have a systematic impact on the reported results. 
We use two alternative measures of selection into not being rated to control for this problem. 
First, we use an observed variable (the dummy for unrated) that identifies the nonrated 
professors and proxies this selection into rating. Second, we used a generated variable that is a 
prediction of the true probability of being not rated, obtained by estimating a selection 
equation that has variables that are also found in the original model, but also some exclusion 
restrictions, or variables that are important for the selection onto rating but may not be 
important for the other models that we test. Accordingly, we estimate the probability of being 
nonrated by using the same exclusion restrictions (editor, administrative dummy, publications 
prior to 1996) for each model that we test. In the case of the generated regressor, or predicted 
probability of not being rated, the identification may not require strong exclusion restrictions as 
the model can be also weakly identified through the functional form of the probability of being 
nonrated which is a nonlinear function of the regressors used. Note also that the identification 
requirements (strictly exogenous exclusion restriction) for a linear predictor are more stringent 
than the requirements for the non-linear predictor used here. 
Comparison of results obtained using the observed variable (not rated) with those obtained 
using the generated regressor (predicted probability of being rated) raises two significant 
empirical issues. The predicted probability is measured with error as it is generated using a 
selection equation. Therefore, its use adds measurement variability to the estimating equation 
which has impacts for the parameter estimates of the overall model that we choose to test. 
Pagan (1984) in his analysis of regressions containing generated regressors, shows that if the 
generated regressor is consistent, the parameter estimate of the generated regressor will also 
be consistent, as long as the original model is correctly specified. To deal with this issue, we use 
the model that better explains the changes in salaries before introducing the predicted 
probability of not being rated. If the generated regressor estimates the subjective probability 
consistently, there is no inconsistency in the parameter estimates. At worst the standard errors 
of both the generated regressor and the non-generated regressors in the regression equation 
will be increased by the generated regressor’s inconsistent standard errors. Therefore, if we 
observe non-significant changes in the standard errors of the non-generated regressors due to 
the introduction of the generated- regressor, the noise induced by the error in variable 
associated with the generated regressor will have a minimum impact on the other variables.  
On the other hand, proxing the selection of rating with the nonrated dummy uses an observed 
variable that can be measured without error. Moreover, the nonrated dummy may not be free 
of endogeneity problems for all the models that we are testing. Therefore, for the models for 
which we observe a lack of improvement in fit when the dummy is included, we may have 
simultaneity or other types of endogenety problems. 
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In the main body of this paper we have, with the exception of Table 5, reported results 
controlling for selection into rating using the not rated dummy, an observed variable that takes 
on a value of one is the professor has not ratings in ratemyprofessors. Table C1 reproduces the 
results of Tables 1, 2 and 4 using the generated variable, rather than the observed variable, to 
correct for selection into ratemyprofessors. In most cases, the effect of hotness is amplified 
somewhat, but there are few changes in the sign or significance of the results. For the results in 
Tables 1 and 2, there are minimal changes to the log likelihood function when using the 
predicted value of not being rated, as opposed to the actual value. For this reason, and to make 
the results more transparent and easier to interpret, we use the observed rather than the 
predicted value of not being rated to control for selection. 
 
Table C1: Key results using predicted value of “hot rated” 
   hot s.e. N Log 
likelihood 
Table 1, Case 7 All 13,889c 4,205 3455 -13,135 
Table 2      
 Males 15,116c 4,669 3032 -12,287 
 Females -4,887 7,081 423 -796 
 PhD>2000 -1,043 834 229 -386 
 PhD>1995 1,320 802 547 -1,100 
 PhD>1985 13,184c 862 1503 -3,297 
 PhD>1975 13,437c 4,429 2399 -7,072 
Table 4     Chi2 
Log citations Male 0.165 0.148 581 760 
  Female 1.53c 0.309 61 . 
Citations Male -0.150 0.813 1003 . 
 Female -0.228 1.47 128 . 
Annual 
publications 
Male 0.186 0.114 3032 185 
 Female 0.163 0.144 423 . 
Coauthors  Male 0.175 0.142 3032 154 
 Female 0.305a 0.165 423 . 
a) Significant at p=0.10, b) significant at p=0.05, c) significant at p=0.01. For 
full listing of other covariates, see Tables 1, 2 and 4 in main body of text. 
 
